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ABSTRACT 
	
Nel corso degli ultimi decenni, particolare attenzione è stata rivolta, in ambito 
macroeconomico, allo stupefacente sviluppo dell’economia cinese: un fenomeno capace, 
nell’arco temporale di trent’anni, di trasformare uno dei paesi con più basso PIL pro capite al 
mondo nella seconda potenza economica globale, grazie ad un tasso di crescita sostenuto ad un 
livello vicino al 10% annuo.  
Più recentemente, tuttavia, alcuni fattori hanno innescato forti timori per il futuro 
dell’economia cinese, e dato avvio ad una serie di reinterpretazioni della stessa crescita del 
gigante asiatico e delle sue prospettive. In particolare: il crollo della borsa di Shanghai nel 2015; 
la diminuzione, nel corso dello stesso anno, del tasso di crescita annuale del PIL a un livello 
poco superiore al 6%; un recente rialzo nel livello dei salari che sembrerebbe indicare il 
probabile esaurimento, nel breve termine, di quella che è stata la principale fonte di vantaggio 
competitivo nei mercati internazionali per gli esportatori cinesi, ovvero una quasi illimitata 
riserva di forza lavoro a basso costo. 
Nelle pagine che seguono, la performance di crescita dell’economia cinese verrà analizzata 
con l’aiuto di diversi modelli teorici – dai neoclassici a Solow, da Lewis agli istituzionalisti – 
al fine di definire tale recente rallentamento come un fenomeno strutturale piuttosto che ciclico 
e contingente.  
Un’ulteriore analisi verrà inoltre condotta relativamente alle conseguenze di tale 
rallentamento, che sembrerebbe poter essere considerato come l’inevitabile prodotto di 
qualsiasi transizione da un’economia emergente ad un’economia sviluppata. Ci si interrogherà, 
dunque, sulla possibilità, per l’economia cinese, di un ‘soft landing’, vale a dire il 
raggiungimento di un sentiero di crescita sostenibile, sebbene indubbiamente più ‘lento’, 
caratterizzato da tassi di crescita paragonabili a quelli attualmente registrati dalle economie 
occidentali. A tal fine verrà sostenuta la necessità, da parte delle istituzioni cinesi, di convertire 
il proprio modello di sviluppo, dall’attuale orientamento all’accumulazione di capitale e 
all’export, verso una maggiore enfasi su avanzamento tecnologico e consumo interno, e al 
tempo stesso di affrontare le sfide poste, a livello ambientale e sociale, da un sistema 
economico-politico ancora ibrido e non democratico.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the last decades, and particularly since the first years of the new millennium, a 
narrative has emerged concerning the global equilibria, suggesting that the newly emerging 
economic power of the People’s Republic of China had grown so far as to jeopardize the global 
leadership of the USA in the medium term. 
However, as unrestrained optimism has followed the more than three decades of sustained 
Chinese GDP growth – at astounding two-digit rates, averaging nearly 10% per year -, 
symmetrically pessimism has recently started to rise as a consequence of its current slowdown. 
The 2015 collapse of the Shanghai stock market, the decrease of the GDP growth rate to a 
single digit figure – from more than 10% at the beginning of the XXI century to slightly more 
than 6% in 2015 -, rising wages signalling the likely exhaustion, in the short term, of what had 
been a nearly unlimited supply of cheap labour and one of China’s pivotal sources of 
comparative advantage in the international markets, have all started to represent causes of 
concern about the PRC’s economic prospects. 
Nevertheless, both economic theory and empirical experience show that very high levels of 
growth cannot be sustained indefinitely, thus suggesting that China’s slowdown could represent 
a natural development of its growth pattern, rather than the temporary effect of a financial crisis. 
In this work, it will be argued that such is the case, and China’s economic slowdown can 
therefore be defined as a structural, rather than cyclical, phenomenon. 
While acknowledging this structural and necessary nature of the recent developments, 
however, some pivotal aspects of them still require more in-depth analysis. No developed 
country is currently growing as fast as China did for three decades, and the first world economy, 
the USA, is increasing its GDP at an annual rate of slightly more than 2%, thus suggesting that 
declining GDP growth rates are inherent in any transition from a developing towards a mature 
economy. What is still unclear is whether China will be able to manage a smooth transition, 
and transform itself again in order to meet the unavoidable challenges such a transition implies; 
whether, in other words, China’s landing on the ground of a slower, more sustainable pattern 
of growth will be a ‘hard’ or a ‘soft’ one.  
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II. BACKGROUND 
When examining the economic case of China, it is interesting to notice how its very long 
term model of development could, at least until the first decade of the XXI century, be well 
approximated by a ‘U’ shape. 
Indeed, the Eastern Asian giant’s decline started, following a long ‘Golden Age’, during the 
last centuries of the second millennium. Per capita GDP fell, from a level similar to the Western 
European one in the XVI century (see appendix: figure 1), to half its European counterpart in 
1820, eventually worsening at the beginning of the XX century, when it roughly equalled 1/10 
of the Western countries’ average level (Lo, 2007). 
Around the 1950s, China’s fortunes started to improve slightly, while stagnation turned into 
a slow, faltering growth mainly driven by capital accumulation as a consequence of Mao 
Zedong’s ascent to power and establishment of a planned socialist economy. 
However, only with Mao’s successor Deng Xiaoping and his gradual, pragmatic approach 
to a mostly successful series of economic reforms, could China’s growth eventually quicken its 
pace, and be sustained – at nearly 10% GDP increase per year – for more than three decades.  
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1. An overview of the concept of growth 
From an economic perspective, development is often used as a synonym of growth, and 
measured by one fundamental indicator: the GDP growth rate, showing the speed at which the 
economic value of a country’s output increases in time. 
As the ultimate aim of economic policy seems to be a sustained and relatively fast-paced 
GDP growth, and the economic debate itself is mostly focused on defining and implementing 
those drivers which are most likely to be conducive to growth, different theories have emerged, 
especially during the last seventy years, in order to highlight the necessary preconditions 
underlying economic development, as well as attempting to explain the differences among 
countries in terms of economic performance (Todaro et al., 2011). 
Common to most of these theories is the idea that output growth is the resultant of two 
pivotal elements combined: capital accumulation (both physical and human capital, including 
financial assets, equipment, land, inputs, labour, workforce’s level of education) and 
productivity growth, the last one referring to technology, management skills and knowledge 
increasing the quantity of output which is to be obtained from a given amount of capital, labour, 
or both – productivity of capital, labour and Total Factor Productivity respectively. 
Differences between such theories, on the contrary, mostly focus on the drivers of both 
capital accumulation and productivity growth, as well as on the contribution of each element to 
the overall level of growth. 
According to one perspective, it is possible to explain the economic performance of most 
developing countries – of which China, and beforehand the four ‘Asian Tigers’ of Singapore, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea, represent emblematic examples - as the mere effect of 
capital accumulation: namely, a high level of savings and a plentiful supply of relatively well-
educated workforce (Krugman, 1994). 
On the other hand, as first highlighted by Solow (1956) and then Romer (1990), capital 
accumulation is unlikely to support a sustained and sustainable pattern of growth on its own. 
Productivity gains, particularly in the form of technological progress, are needed in order to 
avoid, or postpone, the attainment of the steady state, when returns on capital start to decrease 
due to depreciation, and output per worker ceases to increase.  
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2. Explaining the Chinese performance 
Although it is likely that both capital accumulation and Total Factor Productivity growth 
accounted for the economic development of China after 1978 (Hu and Khan, 1997; Lo, 2007; 
Ding and Knight, 2009; Brandt and Zhu, 2010; Zhu, 2012; Wu, 2014), still much debate exists 
about the extent of the contribution of each of these factors to the overall GDP growth. 
 Such a debate seems to echo the arduous interpretation of the previous exploit of the eight 
High Performing Asian Economies, regarded by some (World Bank, 1994) as a ‘miracle’ of 
ideal institutions and high productivity and by others (Krugman, 1994) as the simple, one-off 
result of particularly high levels of capital accumulation. 
In the case of China as well, indeed, ‘optimists’ and ‘pessimists’ seem to give opposite 
interpretation of what is, undeniably, an extraordinary economic performance, allowing output 
to grow at a fast pace – nearly 10% per year – for more than three decades, and per capita 
income to multiply by four fold since 1978 (Wu, 2014). 
More specifically, Young’s (2003) decomposition of China’s growth highlights a TFP 
growth of approximately 1.4% per year, representing less than 20% of the total GDP annual 
increase. On the contrary, Bosworth and Collins (2008) recognise a TFP contribution of nearly 
40% (approximating productivity growth to an average of 3.6% per year, out of a total GDP 
annual growth of 9.3% on average between 1978 and 2004). Other works suggest still different 
figures, thus highlighting the complexity inherent in the measurements themselves, mostly 
related to the dubious quality of the data, both about production inputs (capital and labour) and 
output, sometimes as a result of misleading incentives related to their collection, sometimes as 
a consequence of the unclear levels of prices originating from a still hybrid economic system. 
2.1 The role of economic reforms 
While the exact contribution of TFP growth to the overall GDP growth is still disputed, 
however, a nearly unanimous consensus supports the idea that a pivotal role in underlying 
productivity gains was played by the partial correction of economic distortions due to the non-
market system existing in China, and particularly related to misallocation of resources, fixed 
prices and misleading incentives. 
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Indeed, GDP growth started its astounding acceleration soon after 1978, year marking the 
start of Deng Xiaoping’s leadership and of his Comprehensive Economic Reform, aimed at 
transforming the whole Chinese system from a planned economy into a ‘socialist market 
economy with “Chinese characteristics”’ (Hou, 2011). 
Chronologically, the first sector to be addressed was, at the beginning of the 1980s, the 
agricultural one, as Deng’s predecessor Mao Zedong had apparently failed in addressing the 
particularly low level of rural productivity, eventually resulting in the inability to feed the 
burgeoning Chinese population – leading to the Great Chinese Famine in 1959 - and in the 
employment of an excessive number of workers in the agricultural sector, without a 
corresponding increase in output. By contrast, rural reforms enacted by Deng Xiaoping, such 
as the introduction of the Household Responsibility System, were particularly successful in 
enhancing the productivity of the rural sector, as they provided more effective, market-based 
incentives. More specifically, farmers were allowed to sell at market prices the amount of 
output exceeding the production quota typical of a planned economic system (Hou, 2011; 
Huang, 2012), and were thus encouraged to increase both their overall level of production and 
their productivity. 
The industrial sector was also addressed by a series of economic reforms, mainly aimed at 
improving the efficiency of the State Owned Enterprises, and at gradually allowing the 
emergence and development of a private sector alongside the public one. As a result, overall 
productivity rose as competition increased due to the newly born private sector, as well as 
because of the introduction of a system of incentives based on the market-oriented concept of 
profitability. 
A third broad objective pursued by Deng Xiaoping and his successors was the progressive 
opening-up of the country to the global economy, which was achieved through a three-phased 
series of reforms involving the creation of Special Economic Zones, the gradual allowance of 
Foreign Direct Investment and partial liberalization of the financial sector, and the entrance in 
the World Trade Organization. Such an opening-up arguably resulted in both a far greater 
contribution of trade – and particularly exports – to the Chinese economy and GDP growth, and 
in technological spill-overs allowing China to catch up with more advanced economies (Perkins, 
1994; Hou, 2011). 
Overall reforms, although mainly implemented in a gradual, unconventional pattern 
allowing them to adapt to the Chinese national and local reality (Qian, 2002; Fan et al., 2013), 
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were arguably aimed at addressing the distortions of the pre-existing non-market system, by 
introducing both market prices and incentive systems, thus suggesting that China’s growth 
could be almost entirely explained, from an institutional perspective, as the result of the mere 
correction of distortions and, as such, arguably a one-off phenomenon, unlikely to be repeated.  
2.2 The Lewis model 
Reforms undoubtedly played a pivotal role in transforming China’s socialist, planned and 
rural economy into a ‘socialist market economy’ characterized by a strong preponderance of 
the industrial, and particularly manufacturing, sector.  
However, if rural reforms were fundamental in introducing quasi-market incentives as well 
as in encouraging productivity growth in the agricultural sector, the phenomenon of structural 
transformation cannot be fully explained without the contribution of Lewis’ (1954) model, 
which is particularly effective in schematizing the development pattern of most recently 
industrializing economies. 
According to Lewis, indeed, GDP growth is ultimately the result of the massive transfer of 
work force from a traditional, rural sector towards a modern, industrial one, characterized by 
higher levels of labour productivity: 
MPLT < MPLM, 
where T and M identify the traditional and modern sector respectively (Zhu and Cai, 2012). 
The rural sector is also differentiated from the industrial one by the the validity of the 
inequality: 
WT > MPLT,  
signalling that wages in the traditional sector, or ‘subsistence wages’, do not mirror the marginal 
productivity of rural labour, which is close to 0. As a consequence, the transfer of rural labourers 
to the industrial sector (where, on the contrary, the equation WM = MPLM applies) does not 
affect the total amount of rural output, but simply increases the level of rural productivity.  
Eventually, the employment of rural surplus labour in the higher-productivity sector results 
in a productivity increase characterizing the economy as a whole, while at the same time 
encouraging higher levels of investment in the industrial sector - where the returns on capital 
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are particularly high as wages are kept at a low level by the virtually unlimited supply of labour 
-, thus boosting overall GDP growth. 
Arguably, however, a productivity rise in the rural sector is not only a consequence, but 
also a pivotal precondition to releasing part of the farmers from their jobs in agriculture 
(Kennedy et al., 2006; Zhang et al., 2011; Zhu, 2012), and allowing their migration towards 
industrial areas. Indeed, if the relation MPLT ~ 0 persisted, a considerable amount of rural 
workers would still be needed in order to produce a sufficient amount of agricultural output. 
In the case of China, Lewis’ explanation is particularly relevant when the specific 
conditions characterizing the East Asian giant after 1978 are taken into account: particularly 
high population growth rates during the 1950s resulted, in the 1980s and first 1990s, in a 
peaking working-age population, thus explaining the presence of a nearly unlimited supply of 
cheap labour force migrating from the rural areas towards the newly industrializing coastal 
areas (see appendix: figure 2). Furthermore, the enactment of rural reforms resulting in higher 
levels of productivity in the agricultural sector arguably played a pivotal role in releasing 
several Chinese farmers from their agricultural work, and allowing them to be employed in the 
industrial sector. 
2.3 Harrod-Domar, Solow and the contribution of savings 
Alongside particularly favourable demographic conditions, China was also characterized 
by an outstanding level of savings, both at a private and at a public level, as a result of a 
particularly high savings rate, peaking at a level of over 53% in 2008 (see appendix: figure 3). 
From a neoclassical perspective, high levels of savings undoubtedly play a pivotal role in 
producing economic growth, as the accumulation of financial capital results in higher levels of 
investment, and consequently of output. 
As shown by the model of growth proposed first by Harrod and then by Domar, indeed, 
GDP growth (∆𝑌/𝑌) can be expressed by the equation: Δ𝑌𝑌 = 	 𝑠)𝑐 − 	𝛿 
where sG represents the gross national savings ratio, and 1/c is the national output-capital 
or output-investment ratio (Y/K), expressing the amount of additional output that can be 
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obtained from an additional unit of capital - or investment, as capital and investment are 
assumed to coincide in the Harrod-Domar model (Todaro, 2011). 
Therefore, a direct relationship exists between a country’s savings ratio and its level of GDP 
growth, as opposed to the inverse proportionality characterizing the relationship between 
capital-output ratio (K/Y) and output growth, highlighting the role of diminishing returns on 
capital in stifling GDP growth. Symmetrically, a positive role is played by Y/K, being the 
inverse of c and representing the output-investment ratio and therefore the level of productivity, 
although no explicit mention is made concerning this last element in the Harrod-Domar model.  
2.4 Final remarks about three decades of growth 
As more than one single factor seems to have accounted for China’s outstanding economic 
performance during the three decades following Mao Zedong’s death, more than one theory is 
required in order to provide a convincing explanation of it. Apparently, both accumulation of 
physical and human capital and productivity growth have played a fundamental role, while 
underlying both of them was arguably the deep structural transformation of the Chinese 
economy, from a planned, agricultural economy towards a market-oriented, industrial one.  
Such a deep and fast-paced transformation was, indeed, the result of the combination of 
favourable demographic conditions and reforms aimed at changing the institutional framework, 
with a particular focus on incentives at every level of the Chinese economy, and eventually 
successful in achieving significant productivity gains. These gains were, in turn, obtained both 
in the rural sector and in the industrial one, as well as from the massive transfer of inputs 
between them. 
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III. CHINA’S TURNING POINT 
Since June 2015, the Shanghai stock market has lost more than 40% of its value (Frankel, 
2016), thus generating the idea, among investors as well as international observers, that the 
Chinese economy would be on the edge of a declining slope.  
From a broader perspective, the stock market crash seems to be no more than an ‘iceberg 
tip’, as suggested by both Frankel (2015) and The Economist (2016): the capital market does 
not play as significant a role in China as it does in more developed economies, as most of the 
country’s savings are invested in bank deposits and in the housing market (Fang et al., 2015), 
while the stock market remains much more unstable and ‘immature’ than most of their Western 
counterparts, as shown by the reliance of the government on the method of ‘circuit breakers’ to 
deal with losses (Biswas and Hartley, 2016). 
Indeed, although the current economic slowdown of the world’s most populated country is 
undeniable, its evidence is mainly to be found elsewhere, among ‘real economy’ data which 
have recently been showing a decreasing GDP growth rate – well below 7% in both 2015 and 
the first half of 2016 (Magnier, 2016; Wildau and Mitchell, 2016) from the 10% rate 
characterizing most of the years before 2010. As for its explanation, the same economic models 
clarifying China’s extraordinary performance since 1978 can arguably also account for its 
current slowdown. 
A GDP growth rate of nearly 10% is, undoubtedly, hardly sustainable beyond the already 
extraordinary time lapse of three decades, and the models developed by theorists such as Solow 
(1956), Romer (1990) and Lewis (1954) provide convincing explanations of both China’s 
recent rise to becoming the second world economy and of the current slackening of its economy.  
A particularly low starting point, allowing for a faster-paced output growth while tending 
towards the steady state, technological catching up with more developed economies and 
structural transformation from agricultural to industrial economy, were arguably one-off factors 
allowing China to grow at a sustained pace for more than three decades, as were most of Deng 
Xiaoping’s successful attempts at addressing the distortions of a planned socialist economy 
through the introduction of market-oriented rules and institutions. 
However, while it is usually agreed that a bigger economy is unlikely to sustain two-digit 
growth rates, it is still to be understood whether China’s ‘landing’ on the ground of slow or 
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stagnating growth, where most developed economies have already been dwelling for decades, 
is going to be a ‘soft’ or a ‘hard’ one (Frankel, 2016).  
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1. The Neoclassical model 
1.1 The first Solow model 
According to Solow, probably inspired by the previous Harrod-Domar model, the pace of 
growth of output per capita in a specific country economy significantly depends on the level of 
savings (measured by the average saving rate, s) and consequently of capital investments in the 
short term (Kt+1 = (1 - ∂)Kt + It , or 
-./01 = 1 − 𝜕 -.1 + 𝑠 5.1), but eventually becomes null in 
the long term unless productivity growth, only present in Solow’s extended model as an 
exogenous factor, intervenes. 
Therefore, the first Solow model is mainly focused on defining the concept of ‘steady state’, 
the long-term equilibrium of an economy where output growth equals n, or the rate of 
population growth, and the level of both capital and output per capita is thus stable.  
Nevertheless, even in the long term, the savings rate still plays a pivotal role, as it 
contributes to the definition of the level of capital and output per capita that are likely to be 
achieved when the steady-state equilibrium occurs. 
In the case of China, both high saving rates (reaching peaks of above 50% in the first decade 
of the 2000s – see appendix: figure 3) and a particularly low initial level of capital and output 
per capita – China was the poorest area of the world in terms of GDP per capita at the beginning 
of the 1980s, as highlighted by Ding and Knight (2009) – contributed to a particularly fast-
paced and long-sustained convergence to a steady state which appears not to have been reached 
yet.  
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Indeed, the level of GDP per capita is still significantly lower than its high-income 
economies’ counterparts, and if cross-country differences in terms of the output per capita level 
at the steady state is mainly to be explained by different levels of savings, where a direct 
proportionality exists between s and Y*/L (or K*/L), it is likely that scope for growth is still left 
to the Chinese economy, although the pace of economic development is likely to slow down as 
the steady state comes closer (as shown by the convexity of the functions depicted in the graph 
above). 
1.2 Taking productivity growth into account 
When the first Solow model - where a long-term equilibrium is to be reached in the form of 
a steady state when both capital and output per capita are stable, and their growth rates null - is 
extended, a third element is to be introduced in the neoclassical production function, so that:  𝑌 = 𝑓 𝐾, 𝐿, 𝐴 . 
In the equation above, A represents the level of technological advancement, or the Total Factor 
Productivity, according to different interpretations. In the perspective of this extended model, 
assuming that A grows at a constant rate g, both capital and output would increase at a rate 
equal to n+g, while their per capita values would grow at a pace equal to g, or the rate of 
technological development. 
According to this model, economy can virtually grow indefinitely, by avoiding the 
diminishing returns on scale through the productivity gains resulting from technological 
advancement as well as from an improved allocation of production inputs. 
Nevertheless, the nature of technological progress itself seems to provide a further 
explanation of China’s current slowdown, as well as of its past faster-paced growth. 
According to Romer (1990), indeed, technology, and progress in general terms, differs 
significantly from the majority of economic goods, in its being both non-rival and partially 
excludable. As a non-rival good, it is not subject to the law of diminishing returns, as it cannot 
be exhausted through repeated use by different economic actors. In addition, its partially 
excludable nature explains the phenomenon of ‘technological spill-overs’, namely partial and 
often casual transfers of knowledge between economic actors, usually taking place, at a 
macroeconomic level, between countries at different levels of development, usually from the 
most advanced economies towards the developing ones. 
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In such perspective, an under-developed economy can improve its productivity faster than 
a developed one, as it is far less complex to reach the global technology frontier than to shift it 
outwards. 
Indeed, during the last decades, while innovation and productivity gains have apparently 
played a pivotal role in contributing to China’s economic performance, paired with capital 
accumulation - as the country’s economic growth arguably started when China was far from its 
steady state -, such gains were mainly the result of the country’s technological catching up with 
the most advanced world economies. 
This phenomenon was reported by both Romer (2004) and Abrami et al. (2014), and was 
defined by the latter as ‘innovation by acquisition’, thus highlighting the fundamental role 
played by knowledge transfers from abroad – mainly Europe and USA – in the form of both 
technology and management skills. 
1.3 From catch-up to innovation 
Recently, indeed, the scope left for catching up with foreign economies seems to have 
narrowed considerably, as China begins approaching the global technology frontier, and as 
reported by Woetzel et al. (2015), an ‘innovation imperative’ is starting to face the second world 
economy. In order to sustain high levels of economic growth, the East Asian giant should 
therefore more convincingly embrace a focus on pure innovation, as opposed to imitation and 
adaptation of foreign technology; a focus for which, however, China still seems to lack a fitting 
cultural and institutional framework, at least in the short term. 
As highlighted by Abrami et al. (2014), indeed, despite significant investment and focus on 
academic education and research and development on the part of the Chinese government, the 
institutional and political system is still far from favourable to innovation. The influence of the 
Communist party is widespread both among firms and at the academic level, with party 
members playing a huge decisional and control role in boards and committees. The East Asian 
giant seems to lack that freedom of thought which is undoubtedly a fundamental precondition 
for pure innovation, as opposed to the mere adaptation of foreign ideas and incremental 
improvement. 
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2. Reaching the Lewis Turning Point 
2.1 Signals of a structural slowdown 
A further contribution to the explanation of China’s recent slowdown is arguably provided 
by the model of Arthur Lewis. As highlighted by both Das and N’Diaye (2013) and Cai (2015), 
China seems to be currently reaching what is known as the ‘Lewis Turning Point’, a moment 
in time or, more likely, a time lapse, characterized by the exhaustion of surplus labour in the 
rural sector and by consequently rising wages, in turn resulting in lower returns on investments 
and in a shrinking amount of capital available in the industrial sector. 
During its first structural transition, transforming the Asian country from a stagnating rural 
economy into a thriving industrial one, China had heavily relied on what has been defined as 
its primary source of comparative advantage in global markets (Cai, 2015), namely a seemingly 
unlimited supply of cheap labour force.  
An inexpensive – but relatively well-educated – workforce, indeed, has apparently been the 
pivotal element underlying China’s role as ‘the world’s factory’ (Zhang et al., 2011; Zhu and 
Cai, 2012), acting as a lure for Foreign Direct Investment as well as allowing the production of 
cheap manufactured goods to be exported in order to boost the trade component of China’s 
GDP. During the last years, however, the second world economy has seemingly started to show 
some signals of rising wages, which are particularly significant when opposed to the stagnating 
trend of inflation (see appendix: figure 6): Zhang (2012) reports a 13.8% rise in labour costs 
per employee - measured in Renminbi - in the urban manufacturing sector between 2003 and 
2010, while Cai and Du (2011) calculate an average annual growth rate of 10.2% between 2000 
and 2010 for the monthly salaries of migrant workers (see appendix: figure 4). 
2.2 The demographic factor 
Arguably, the development of China’s strong comparative advantage in manufacturing at 
an international level during the last three decades has been significantly linked to the 
particularly ‘favourable’ demographic conditions of the 1980s and 1990s, following the 
demographic boom of the 1950s and 60s.  
As a consequence of both a natural trend, as higher levels of development are usually 
associated with a lower birth rate, and of government policies aimed at restricting an 
excessively burgeoning population, however, such favourable demographic conditions have 
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begun deteriorating already at the end of the XX century, when the growth rate of working age 
population has started to decrease (see appendix: figure 2). 
Indeed, as proposed by Feng (2011), who also mentions a ‘young and productive labor force’ 
among the fundamental factors underlying China’s past economic boom - accounting for an 
estimated 15 to 25% of the total growth between 1980 and 2000 -, it is likely that the recent 
weakening of demographic growth, and the increasing dependency ratio, will eventually result 
in a shrinking economic growth. 
Furthermore, Feng opposes the idea that a relaxation of Deng’s one-child policy would lead 
to a radical change in the short-term scenario of a reduced supply of cheap rural labour. 
According to his 2011 work, indeed, the Chinese fertility rate decreased throughout the second 
half of the twentieth century mainly because of ‘individual choice’, which resulted in turn from 
improving economic conditions, while the government’s birth-control policies played only a 
secondary role. According to data, indeed, total fertility rate has more than halved, from 5.8% 
to 2.3%, between 1970 and 1980, some years before the one-child policy was introduced, at the 
beginning of the 1980s. 
 1950 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 
Population size 
(millions) 
552 829.9 987.1 1,143.3 1,265.8 1,307.6 
Birth rate 
(per thousand) 
37 33.4 18.2 21.1 14 12.4 
Death rate 
(per thousand) 
18 7.6 6.3 6.7 6.5 6.5 
Natural increase 
(per thousand) 
19 25.8 11.9 14.4 7.6 5.9 
Total fertility rate 5.8 5.8 2.3 2.3 1.6 1.5 
Source: Feng, 2011 
In this perspective, the recent modification of the one-child policy in order to allow two-
children families in 2015 (Phillips, 2015) is unlikely to result in a substantial increase in fertility, 
as it would be unable to oppose the natural correlation between decreasing fertility and 
economic growth. 
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Moreover, in addition to the effect of the overall demographic trends, a fundamental role in 
accounting for China’s development of its comparative advantage has arguably been played by 
the gradual relaxation of the hukou system, namely the household registration system which 
was introduced in 1958 in order to control migration and labor mobility between rural and urban 
areas, as well as across different regions (Fang and Dewen, 2005). Although a further 
liberalization of rural-urban migrations could still play some role in the near future, the large-
scale effects of the first liberalization are unlikely to be repeated, thus further increasing the 
influence of the current negative demographic trends on the short- and medium-term outlook 
of the Chinese economy. 
Indeed, although it is sometimes argued that surplus labour is still largely available to 
Chinese firms, thus denying that Lewis Turning Point scenario is going to occur, at least in the 
short-term, data about the actual availability of rural workers are themselves highly uncertain, 
and figures are often overestimated, as observed by both Zhu and Cai (2012) and Cai (2010), 
the last mentioning, as responsible for such uncertainty, both the changing sources of 
employment (increasingly private enterprises as opposed to state-owned enterprises) and the 
growing importance of informal as opposed to formal employment. 
Overall, a ‘pessimistic’ interpretation seems more convincing, calling for the end of the first 
demographic dividend – which, according to Lee and Mason (2006) is a period during which 
the working age population grows more rapidly than the non-productive share of the population, 
thus lowering the dependency rate and freeing up investment capital - and the exhaustion of 
what had appeared to be a virtually unlimited reserve of cheap labour to be transferred from the 
agricultural sector to the industrial one in order to boost both returns on capital and overall 
productivity. 
2.3 The contribution of productivity  
Alongside the demographic element, productivity gains at both the rural and industrial level 
have apparently played a fundamental role in the structural transformation of the Chinese 
economy as well. Among the drivers of such gains, in turn, the reallocation of factors of 
production, and specifically labour, seems to have contributed to most part of the overall TFP 
growth, which can be defined as the resultant of both intra-sector and inter-sector productivity 
gains, as highlighted by Fang and Dewen (2005). According to their calculations, indeed, a 
better allocation of workforce alone accounted for 20% of total GDP growth between 1978 and 
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1997, while intra-sector productivity, or technical advancement, contributed to a far lower 3% 
during the same years (see appendix: figure 7). 
As reported by Zhu (2012), however, the contribution of inputs reallocation from 
agriculture to the industrial sector to the overall productivity growth has arguably decreased 
over time. Indeed, as a result of the decline of the agriculture’s share of the Chinese economy 
as a whole, both in terms of employment and value added, the rural sector has shrunk in its 
contribution to productivity growth from a percentage of 2.1% per year between 1978 and 1988 
to one of 0.6% between 1998 and 2007, thus also reducing the extent of the reallocation of rural 
inputs to the industrial sector. In addition, such a decreasing trend seems likely to persist in the 
future, thus reducing the prospects of productivity growth to its intra-sector component, namely 
the one resulting from technological progress as opposed to simple inputs reallocation.  
Undoubtedly, the decomposition of economic growth into its main drivers – physical and 
human capital, labour and productivity – is not devoid of complexity, and particularly so in the 
case of China, where official economic data are often lacking or uncertain (Brandt and Zhu, 
2010; Wu, 2014). However, although different figures have been proposed in order to quantify 
the contribution of productivity growth to overall economic growth – from nearly 15% 
according to Young (2003), to the more than 77% contribution to per capita GDP growth 
proposed by Zhu (2012) -, the view highlighting the role played by inter-sector productivity 
gains in accounting for China’s overall economic performance seems quite convincing, as well 
as particularly effective in accounting for the current slowdown, as the shrinking contribution 
of inputs reallocation to overall productivity growth can at least partially justify the slower pace 
of overall GDP growth.  
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3. A new structural transition 
3.1 The Chinese ‘new normal’ and the service sector  
As China reaches its Lewis Turning Point, characterized by the exhaustion of rural surplus 
labour as well as by a far narrower scope for inter-sector productivity gains, part of the labour 
force currently employed in the industrial sector is likely to undergo a further transfer towards 
the emerging service sector, characterized by a lower level of productivity (Baumol, 1967), thus 
allowing a second structural transformation to take place, as well as probably reducing China’s 
prospects for additional productivity gains. 
In Baumol’s (1967) view, indeed, economic activities can be classified into two broad 
categories, according to their technological structure: the ones that are subject to rapid increases 
in productivity, and the ones undergoing such increases only at a slow and sporadic pace. 
More specifically, the major element of differentiation is the role of labour as a productive 
input: whether it is primarily an instrument for the attainment of the final product, or whether 
it is the final product itself, in turn justifies if labour-saving technologies can be introduced - 
without harming the quality perceived by the final customer – and therefore whether 
productivity gains can be achieved. 
In Baumol’s model, where the only considered input cost is the hourly wage Wt, assumed 
to be the same across the two sectors of the economy (an industrial sector with productivity 
growing at a r rate, Y2t = bL2tert and a service one characterized by zero productivity growth, 
Y1t = aL1t), relative costs in the constant-productivity sector (C1/Y1) rise, as a consequence of 
wages growing to reflect the productivity gains in the other sector. Eventually, diminishing 
returns on scale are incurred in in the constant productivity sector, thus resulting in higher prices, 
decreasing demand, and a lower amount of output produced – under the condition of elastic 
demand.  A different scenario, where demand elasticity is low or the goods produced by the 
constant productivity sector are considered ‘merit goods’ – and therefore the demand is stable 
as a result of subsidies and incentives provided by the public sector –, would imply that a bigger 
amount of inputs is needed in order to produce the same amount of output. 
In the case of China, the share of GDP accounted for by the service sector is currently 
showing an upward trend, reaching a level of over 50% in 2015, as opposed to the symmetrical 
decline of the industrial sector (see appendix: figure 11). These figures seem therefore to 
confirm the pertinence of Baumol’s model and of his explanation of a slackening GDP growth 
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as a result of the transfer of productive inputs – mainly labour – from a high-productivity to a 
less efficient sector, in a pattern which is analogous and contrary to the first structural 
transformation depicted by Lewis’ model. 
Nevertheless, a structural rebalancing of the Chinese economy towards services and 
consumption, even if characterized by a single-digit GDP growth rate, seems rather desirable, 
to the point of being defined as China’s ‘new normal’ (KPMG International team, 2015); as 
China is arguably exhausting its main source of comparative advantage, namely an abundant 
supply of cheap labour, policies should actually be adopted in order to ease and encourage an 
overall structural change of the Chinese economy as a whole, and eventually achieve a ‘soft 
landing’ on the ground of a more sustainable pattern of growth. 
As suggested by both Zhu and Cai (2012), Das and N’Diaye (2013) and Cai (2015), efforts 
are required from the Chinese government in order to rebalance an excessively investment-
driven, export-oriented economy with a strong focus on manufacturing towards a consumption 
and productivity-driven one, where the absolute prevalence of manufacturing is challenged by 
an emerging service sector. Such a structural transformation, even though characterized by a 
slower pace for economic growth, seems indeed to be an unavoidable element of any transition 
from a developing towards a developed economy, and thus an objective to be achieved rather 
than an obstacle to the East Asian giant’s development in the long term. 
3.2 A second demographic dividend 
Justifying the emergence of a second structural transition is also the idea, proposed by Lee 
and Mason (2006), that the positive impact of demographic conditions on the economic 
development of industrializing countries is not exhausted with the first demographic dividend, 
namely a period characterized by a rising support ratio (the ratio of producers to consumers) 
and the availability of high amounts of investment capital. On the contrary, a second 
demographic dividend is likely to follow, as the huge mass of young labourers of the first 
demographic dividend gets older, and consequently more likely to accumulate financial assets 
in anticipation of retirement, thus further increasing the availability of investment capital. 
Financial capital would therefore increasingly replace the human capital of the first structural 
transition depicted by the model of Arthur Lewis.  
As China is currently exhausting its first demographic dividend, the second one is likely to 
follow in the short term, and could even be already in progress – as the particularly high saving 
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rates, resulting in high levels of investment as opposed to consumption (see appendix: figure 
12) seem to show. 
According to Lee and Mason, however, the successful exploitation of the potential of a 
second demographic dividend is not automatic: effective economic policies are indeed 
fundamental, especially in China, in order to allow as well as to foster a profitable employment 
of growing amounts of financial capital, and a further openness to international markets – to be 
considered not only as recipients of exports, but also at a financial level, as providers of 
investment opportunities for Chinese savers – is arguably required in order to fully exploit such 
potential.   
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4. The role of institutions 
4.1 The institutional context 
Among the ultimate determiners of growth, institutions have often been named alongside 
productivity gains and capital accumulation, mostly in terms of a framework of formal and 
informal rules and social structures, and particularly of incentives, eventually encouraging – or 
stifling – economic development, as first observed by North (1994). An unfavourable 
institutional context, indeed, seems to underlie most unsuccessful experience of economic 
growth, as shown, for instance, by the analysis of the economic performance of several Sub 
Saharan African countries provided by Birdsall (2007) and Collier (2007), where poverty and 
underdevelopment appear to be inextricably related to the presence of conflicts and the 
weakness of institutions.  
As the opposite seems to be true as well, in such perspective Chinese institutions, and 
mainly the series of reforms enacted by Deng Xiaoping after 1978 with the aim of transforming 
a socialist, planned economy into a ‘hybrid’, ‘socialist market’ one, are likely to have played 
no less than a pivotal role in accounting for China’s extraordinary economic development. 
However, if on one side of the debate the gradualism and peculiarity of Chinese reforms 
have led many to declare the end of the universal validity of the Washington consensus, with 
its emphasis on free markets and the absence of state intervention, and to praise the ‘purposive 
involvement of the state in helping structural transformation’ (Fan et al., 2013), on the other 
side it has been argued that reforms were only effective as long as they addressed the distortions 
deriving from a non-market economy, and merely replaced the socialist institutions with 
market-oriented ones (Qian, 2002).  
As well as denying the pivotal role played by the institutions – at least the formal ones – in 
shaping the Chinese growth pattern, such perspective would also suggest a narrower scope left 
for institutions to boost economic growth, as the most obvious inefficiencies have arguably 
been addressed already. Apparently, indeed, the mostly successful correction of the distortions 
stemming from a purely planned economy, as well as its opening up to the international markets, 
has played a pivotal role in bringing the Chinese economy closer to the levels of productivity 
characterizing more technologically advanced countries. 
Nevertheless, significant scope seems still to be left for further improvement. According to 
Zhu (2012), China’s productivity is still less than one third of the US one, while further reforms 
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reducing the overall level of inefficiencies of its economic system to a level comparable to the 
American one would likely result in an additional gain, in terms of Total Factor Productivity, 
of 30% for China’s industrial sector. 
4.2 The ‘Silk Road Vision’ 
One of the fundamental focuses of more than three decades of reforms in China has arguably 
been the country’s increasing openness towards the international scene. In particular, such a 
long-term objective has started to be more convincingly pursued since 2001, year in which the 
East Asian giant joined the World Trade Organization.  
The first decade of the twenty-first century has, since then, been characterized by further 
reforms aimed at achieving a Chinese integration in the global economy, by partially and 
gradually liberalizing both the trade and financial sector. In order to access the WTO, China’s 
average import tariff has fallen from about 43% to nearly 10% between the end of the twentieth 
century and 2001 (Singh, 2011), and reforms have been implemented in order to allow inflows 
of investment from foreign firms to enter China, including the traditionally state-controlled 
fields of telecommunication and finance, while quota on most of the Chinese exports have in 
turn been removed by the other WTO members (Chow, 2001).  
Apparently, joining the WTO has eventually resulted in substantial benefits for the Chinese 
economy. Wang (2011) highlights how China’s growth indicators significantly improved after 
its accession to WTO, achieving an average annual GDP growth rate of 10.5%, and of 27.3% 
for imports and exports, between 2001 and 2007. 
In addition, more ‘intangible’ benefits seem to have resulted from an increased level of 
competition in the domestic market due to its accession by foreign firms, which contributed to 
raise the standard of quality and to generate technological spill-overs. 
Lastly, China’s accession to the WTO seems to have sealed a new period of outward 
openness for the second biggest world economy, as well as opened the way to other initiatives 
in this direction. Though ideologically rooted in the era of Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, the 
‘Silk Road Vision’ is an example of this, as it has undergone significant developments during 
the last decade.  
While China’s GDP growth slows down as its economy rebalances from exports and 
manufacturing towards domestic consumption and the lower-productivity service sector, indeed, 
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China’s increasing openness to the world economy seems to be resulting in a growing influence 
of the East Asian giant in the Pacific area, as highlighted by Kynge (2016), who reports how 
the last three years have witnessed a surge in China’s government-backed loans to other Asian 
economies (see appendix: figure 14). 
Such a trend in China’s financial support targets appears to be a signal of a broader 
ideological refocusing, arguably aimed at extending the PRC’s economic influence on the 
neighbouring countries, and prospectively recreating the ancient ‘Silk Road’ by building 
infrastructure and developing trade linkages between those countries belonging to the strategic 
commercial route which centuries ago linked Eastern Asia to Europe and Africa. Such broader 
plan seems also to be confirmed by China’s financial commitment to the establishment of the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (Lin, 2016), aimed at providing funds for infrastructure-
related projects in the developing world. 
The increasing commitment of the second world economy towards both the economies of 
its geographical neighbours and the developing world in general, paired with its overall 
openness towards the global markets, while identifying China as a second emerging ‘pole of 
influence’ – alongside the USA – is also likely to open new prospects for a healthier, even if 
slower, economic growth, based on a more balanced contribution of trade and on China’s 
growing influence over global economic policies.  
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5. The financial side: a temporary crisis 
Arguably, a pivotal role in triggering the recent surge of worrying about the fate of the 
Chinese economy has been played by its financial markets, and particularly by the Shanghai 
stock market crash, characterized by a decrease of 8.5% in its total value during one single day 
– the 24th of August 2015, or ‘Black Monday’ as reported by the Economist (2015a). 
However, when analysing the recent evolution of the Chinese financial markets, both their 
effects on the country’s real economy and international repercussions seem to be far less 
significant and more manageable than the ones stemming from the past US financial crisis.  
5.1 The Chinese stock market 
High volatility and the frequent succession of peaks and crashes seem to have characterized 
the Chinese stock markets – both the Shanghai and Shenzhen ones – since their reopening in 
1990 (Deng, 2015; Ji and Thomas, 2003). 
Furthermore, according to Fang et al. (2015), the Chinese stock market, although big in 
absolute size – the capitalization of Shenzhen and Shanghai combined equals $8.4 trillion, the 
biggest in the world after the US stock market – is still small relative to the total amount of 
savings available in the country, mostly invested in bank deposits and, more recently, in the 
real estate market. 
In addition to a relatively low capitalization and to a particularly high volatility, the Chinese 
stock market is also characterized by a low openness to international investors, and, 
consequently, by a scarce integration with the global financial system (according to Fahey and 
Chemi (2015), less than 2% of Chinese shares are owned by foreigners), as well as a high degree 
of public control. Indeed, Shanghai and Shenzhen seem to be characterized by the frequent use, 
on the part of the Chinese government, of several tools aimed at preventing an excessive 
devaluation of the Chinese stocks, such as the mechanism of circuit breakers, automatically 
closing the trading day if the market is down by more than 7%, or the daily price limits 
preventing individual daily stock prices from falling by more than 10% (Kim, 2016). 
Arguably, the combination of the aforementioned issues results in a Chinese stock market 
which is both still immature and unable to trigger a financial crisis with worldwide effects 
comparable to the ones stemming from the 2008 US Credit Crunch, thus supporting the idea 
that Shanghai and Shenzhen can hardly mirror the evolution of the broader Chinese economy 
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(Riley, 2016) and that, as highlighted by Boskin (2015), China’s main issues lay well beyond 
its financial markets, rooted, by contrast, in the real economy and in its complex institutional 
framework.   
5.2 The Chinese housing market 
A better estimation of the Chinese economic performance can be inferred by the evolution 
of its housing market, which has recently undergone a period of fast rising prices. Several 
factors underlay the Chinese ‘housing boom’, among which the sustained growth of per capita 
income during the previous decades – at a rate of nearly 9% - seems to have played a pivotal 
role, mostly by generating excessively rosy expectations of a similar growth in the future, and 
thus encouraging several low and middle-income households to buy new houses at high price-
to-income ratios, with the intermediation of the mortgage market. Fang et al. (2015) report 
figures of nearly 8 for current price-to-income ratios: when forecasts are particularly optimistic, 
indeed, such ratio is expected to decrease in the near future as a consequence of a rising 
denominator – income - and families are more eager to sustain higher initial levels. 
Another fundamental factor contributing to the recent boom seems to be ascribable to the 
shortage of investment opportunities facing the high amount of savings available in the Chinese 
economy. Despite the stock market experiencing a relatively rapid growth in the 2000s, indeed, 
bank deposits have always been significantly favoured as investment vehicles. However, as real 
interest rates started to stagnate at an average level of nearly 0.01% in the decade 2003-2013, 
real estate began representing a relevant alternative for Chinese households. Indeed, returns and 
volatility are currently more attractive in the housing market than for both bank deposits and 
equities, averaging annual returns of 15.7% and volatility of 15.4% in first-tier cities (Shanghai, 
Beijing, Guangzhou and Shenzhen) as opposed to the 7.3% annual return and 51.5% volatility 
characterizing the Shanghai stock market in the same period. 
Nevertheless, similarly to the Chinese stock market, the real estate sector is not devoid of 
government intervention, arguably resulting in sizeable price distortions. Following the Chinese 
government targeting of such market as fundamental for the economic development of the 
country, indeed, its characterization as a ‘too-big-to-fall’ sector has began playing a pivotal role 
in encouraging excessive confidence in an unlimited growth of the level of prices. 
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Meanwhile, by contrast, intervention of local governments on the supply side of the market 
have contributed to create a downward pressure on prices, as the public sector has started to 
increasingly rely on the sale of public land for its own funding at the local level. 
The potential – and likely - downward trend of housing prices, paired with the persistence 
of contrasting expectations of an upward trend for both prices and incomes, could represent a 
threat to the stability of the economic system as a whole, as the current price bubble could 
eventually burst if subjected to excessive pressure. If expectations turned more realistic, indeed, 
aligning themselves to the slackening income growth, house prices would eventually plummet.  
However, a crisis comparable to the US Credit Crunch seems rather unlikely: down 
payments of at least 35% of the house value (38% for the lowest end of mortgage-borrowers) 
and the nature of Chinese recourse loans – implying the possibility for banks to collect 
borrowers’ other assets in the event of mortgage defaults –, together with the prohibition of 
mortgage refinancing, lowers the overall level of systemic risk considerably (Fang et al., 2015).  
5.3 Financial reforms 
The financial sector has been among the last to be addressed by the Chinese government’s 
attempts of economic reform, but is apparently arising as one of the current focuses of economic 
policy interventions, mainly as a tool to extend the country’s opening up towards the global 
economy to the financial sphere. 
According to Prasad et al. (2005) and to Prasad (2016), the main challenge posed to China 
in its path towards financial development is currently the implementation of an effective 
combination of financial policies: namely, the establishment of a flexible exchange rate for the 
Renminbi, the liberalization of the Chinese capital account and the internationalization of its 
financial markets, in order to allow a more significant participation of foreign investors by 
removing both formal and informal obstacles.  
Prasad et al. (2005) also highlight how exchange rate flexibility should forerun the opening 
up of the Chinese capital account, as an increased integration with the world economy is likely 
to result in more frequent and wider financial shocks, thus making the availability of a further 
‘control tool’ – a flexible exchange rate, not pegged to foreign currencies such as the US dollar 
– pivotal for the Chinese economy and its Central Bank, the PBC.  
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On the contrary, capital account liberalization, which involves more significant risks, could 
be implemented successively, in a more mature financial context characterized by adequate sets 
of regulations aimed at preventing both the outburst of internal financial shocks and the 
contagion of external ones, as taught by the 2008 Credit Crunch. Allowing the free circulation 
of financial capital in and out of the country without liberalizing the exchange rate, and 
consequently the interest rate could indeed result in significant outflows of investment capital, 
as Chinese savers could choose to invest in the higher-yielding and less volatile liabilities and 
stocks of more advanced foreign financial markets. 
Nevertheless, an open capital account is a fundamental element for a more complete 
integration of China in the world economy, and is likely to bring advantages in the form of both 
increasing FDIs and more investment opportunities for Chinese savers, and particularly for the 
country’s emerging middle class, as highlighted by Biswas and Hartley (2016). 
Eventually, all of the three above-mentioned elements - flexible exchange rate, capital 
account openness and more developed financial markets – seem to be fundamental conditions 
underlying the future status of reserve currency of the Renminbi, which could affect the Chinese 
economy at both a financial and symbolic level, representing the increased integration of China 
in the world economy as well as resulting in advantages such as an easier access to cheap 
foreign credit and a lower currency risk for domestic importers and exporters (Prasad, 2016). 
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6. The challenges ahead 
6.1 The environmental threat  
Some additional aspects are to be taken into account when analysing the past and present 
performance of the Chinese economy. The sustainability of high levels of GDP growth is, 
indeed, far from unconnected to the political, social and environmental spheres, and these are 
likely to exert a significant influence on the future development of the second world economy, 
especially in the long term. 
Environmental degradation, in particular, seems to emerge among the most urgent concerns; 
as highlighted by Albert and Xu (2016), China is currently the world’s largest source of carbon 
emissions, with its huge economy still largely relying on the highly polluting coal (accounting 
for 64.2% of the total energy use in 2014).  
However, in addition to the economic cost of pollution, estimated at nearly 3.5% of GDP, 
or $230 billion in 2010 according to Wong (2013), an even higher cost is arguably arising, from 
a political perspective, for the Chinese Communist Party, as increasingly aware and informed 
citizens start to show their discontent through frequent demonstrations, both in rural and urban 
areas – more than 700 demonstrations arose in 2013 according to Albert and Xu (2016).  
The huge cost exacted by China’s astounding economic growth in terms of both 
environmental degradation and social unrest is unquestionable. What is still uncertain, however, 
is how the East Asian giant is going to tackle the challenge of enacting a further transformation 
of its development pattern, ‘from the explosive growth of the past 30 years to the sustainable 
growth of the next 30 years’ (Wong, 2013). 
Such a challenge is not only technologically complex, as it would arguably require the 
second world economy to dismiss coal as an energy source in order to more convincingly 
embrace greener, renewable sources; it is also characterised by a high political risk, as the 
Party’s legitimacy is almost entirely grounded in a rapidly expanding economy and fast growing 
income levels, and a trade-off between environmental sustainability and fast-paced economic 
development, which is likely to be a reality in the short term, would require highly 
uncomfortable decisions on the part of the Chinese leadership. 
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6.2 The political threat  
Furthermore, environmental concerns are hardly the only cause of political discontent and 
disorders in the one-party China. 
According to Pei (2006), increasing social inequality and widespread corruption, as well as 
economic inefficiencies arising from China’s hybrid institutional system, seem to represent 
particularly thorny issues for the Communist Party to deal with, and potential ‘Achilles’ heels’ 
threatening to undermine the legitimacy of the current political system. 
Indeed, as shown by the recent evolution of the Gini coefficient - measuring the level of 
income inequality among a country’s population with values ranging between 0 and 1, the first 
representing perfect equality and the second maximal inequality -, income distribution seems 
to have grown increasingly unequal during the more than 30 years of China’s economic 
development, from nearly 0.3 to more than 0.5 between the 1970s and 2015 (see appendix: 
figure 12). 
Increasing levels of inequality are arguably both a consequence of widespread corruption 
and of an extraordinarily fast-paced growth, as the Chinese ‘elitist authoritarian regime’ allows 
politically privileged groups to disproportionately increase their wealth, while the state itself is 
in control of the main economic resources and opportunities (Pei, 2006).  
Corruption itself appears, indeed, as an unavoidable appendix of any authoritarian regimes, 
as the lack of ‘democratic constraints from below’, paired with the exploitation of information 
asymmetries with the central government, allows the system’s bureaucrats to engage in rent-
seeking activities. 
Both rising inequality and widespread corruption, being inherent in the nature of the 
Chinese authoritarian regime itself, could easily endanger the stability of the one-party system, 
especially if paired with the public opinion’s rising concerns for the slowing pace of the Chinese 
economy. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
After three decades of extraordinarily fast growth transforming one of the poorest countries 
in the world into the second world economy, the pace of the Chinese economic development 
seems to have eventually slowed down. 
Interpreting this phenomenon in light of the fundamental economic theories of growth, it 
has been concluded that the same elements underlying such an astounding economic 
development as the one experienced by China, can also explain its more recent slowdown.  
Being the explanation of the Chinese performance a particularly complex issue, however, 
more than one model has been used in order to provide a more comprehensive set of causes and 
mechanisms. 
Decomposing the concept of growth into its main components, the role of both capital 
accumulation and productivity gains has been highlighted in its contribution to GDP growth as 
a whole.  
While different attempts have been made, in the last decades, at quantifying the exact 
contribution, in percentage terms, of capital and productivity, obtaining significantly different 
results due to the inherent complexity of such exercise of accounting as well as to the 
uncertainty of data, there seems to be a widespread consensus concerning the pivotal role played 
by both factors, and consequently the exclusion of a purely capital-driven or productivity-driven 
growth. In turn, it is concluded that underlying both capital accumulation and productivity 
growth was apparently a particularly favourable set of structural and institutional conditions, 
namely a booming working-age population and a high saving rate paired with a large scope for 
technological catching up with the most advanced economies and the implementation of mostly 
successful reforms aimed at correcting the distortions of the purely planned economy of Mao 
Zedong’s age. 
Symmetrically, the current slowdown seems to be the consequence of the partial exhaustion 
of such favourable conditions, and particularly of a worsening demographic dividend and a 
narrower scope for both technological catching up and efficiency improvements following the 
correction of the most evident flaws of the socialist system, as well as of the exhaustion of 
China’s fundamental comparative advantage in international markets – the abundant supply of 
cheap surplus labour.  
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Therefore, the new trend of a slower, one-digit GDP growth rate can arguably be defined 
as a structural phenomenon which is likely to characterize the future path of the Chinese 
economy, rather than the temporary effect of unstable financial markets. More uncertain, by 
contrast, is whether China’s slowdown will be characterised by a ‘hard landing’, and thus result 
in a crisis comparable to the 2008 Credit Crunch. 
While it is unquestionable that several challenges are posed to darken the future prospects 
of the second world economy, however, China has already shown in the past an outstanding 
ability to transform itself in order to emerge from its condition of under-developed country.  
Undoubtedly, undergoing a second structural transformation, completing the process of 
opening up to the world economy, dealing with increasingly urgent environmental concerns 
and defending the legitimacy of the one-party system while undermined by a context of 
widespread corruption, rising inequality and a slowing economy are hardly easy challenges. 
However, if China will manage to transform itself into a more consumption-oriented and 
innovation-driven economy, while fully integrating itself in the global market, it is likely to 
persist in its path of development, although at more sustainable growth rates, and eventually 
achieve a ‘soft landing’ on the ground of a sustainable pattern of growth. 
A large scope for further economic growth seems to be left for China: it is mainly a matter 
of further institutional reforms and political will to exploit it, by tackling the huge flaws of its 
hybrid system and encouraging pure innovation by loosening the government control on both 
academic institutions and the business sector.  
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